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ABSTRACT 
Though over a year has passed, the impact of the Dodd Frank Act 
remains unclear. This Note examines the provisions of the Act that 
relate to swap transactions within the context of pre-reform and post-
reform markets. In order to reduce the uncertainties inherent in 
unregulated swap transactions, the Act employs a comprehensive 
framework, which includes mandatory clearing through derivative 
clearing organizations, extensive reporting requirements, margin 
requirements, and position limits. This Note argues that, in doing so, 
the Dodd Frank Act addresses the fundamental failures of pre-reform 
derivative markets. However, the importance of the role for 
derivative clearing organizations under this framework creates a risk 
that these organizations will become systemically significant, 
mirroring problems with under-capitalized and over-exposed 
financial institutions in the downturn. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of the ongoing financial crisis lies one fundamental 
problem: credit.1 This problem was created in large part through a 
mismatch between the actual credit of counterparties and their perceived 
credit.2 Entities trading in at-risk markets were rated higher than their 
true creditworthiness and the products they transacted in were not rated 
to reflect their true risk, exacerbating and magnifying problems once the 
system began to falter.3 Rodgin Cohen, an attorney involved in the 
negotiations between the Federal Reserve and financial actors at the 
center of the crisis, succinctly stated the situation as “the absence of 
knowledge of how much risk is in the system, and where it was.”4 The 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D. Fordham University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Economics and Politics, New 
York University, 2008. I would like to thank Joseph Tycon for encouraging me to 
pursue a course in Derivatives & Risk Management and Professor Alan Rechtschaffen 
for his enjoyable and knowledgeable instruction in the subject. 
 1. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure 
(Part I), 104 NW. U. L. REV. 398, 404 (2010) (“Many structured finance instruments 
were actually far riskier than their ratings might have suggested. As a result, flaws in 
credit rating agency assessments of structured finance instruments often are considered 
a principal underlying cause of the credit crisis.”). See generally ALAN N. 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE LAW 6 (2009) (discussing 
loss of faith in credit ratings and counterparty risk concerns created by dropping value 
of assets securing obligations); Alvin C. Harrell, The Great Credit Contraction: Who, 
What, When, Where and Why, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1209 (2010). 
 2. See Arewa, supra note 1, at 404; Reza Dibadj, Four Key Elements to Successful 
Financial Regulatory Reform, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 377, 382 (2010) (discussing the 
problems with credit rating agencies and the need to reform them). 
 3. See Arewa, supra note 1, at 404 (stating that uncertainty about the valuation of 
credit derivatives contributed to a liquidity crunch that exacerbated the impact of the 
crisis). 
 4. Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to 
Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy 
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crisis continues to manifest itself through a widespread unwillingness to 
lend.5 Many of the government’s efforts to stimulate the economy have 
been targeted towards encouraging lending by pumping funds into the 
economy at practically no cost to the recipient financial institutions, 
lowering the target for the federal funds rate to a quarter of one percent, 
and making large-scale purchases of Treasury securities.6 The difficulty 
in successfully jumpstarting lending demonstrates the depth of the 
crisis.7 
In response to the problems underlying the financial crisis, 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Reform Act”) in July 2010.8 This act significantly 
altered the mandates of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and other 
federal regulators. The Reform Act will also change the way the markets 
for securities and derivatives operate, as well as how participants in 
those markets interact.9 Specifically it focuses on expanding regulatory 
coverage to include swaps and forces market participants into clearing 
                                                                                                                 
Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 863 (2010) (quoting Henny Sender, View From the 
Top, “Interview with Rodgin Cohen,” FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 29, 2010), 
http://video.ft.com/v/82089413001/Apr-29-Rodgin-Cohen). 
 5. See Richard B. Freeman, Reforming the United States’ Economic Model After 
the Failure of Unfettered Capitalism, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685, 692-93 (2010) 
(discussing the freezing of credit and the Treasury’s concern with getting credit markets 
moving). 
 6. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Sixth European Central Bank Central Banking Conference: Emerging 
from the Crisis: Where Do We Stand? (Nov. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20101119b.htm. Chairman 
Bernanke details three steps taken by economic regulators: (1) “expand[ing] existing 
lending facilities and creat[ing] new facilities to provide liquidity to the financial 
sector,” (2) easing “monetary policy through the conventional means of cuts in short-
term policy rates, including a coordinated rate cut in October 2008 by the Federal 
Reserve, the ECB, and other leading central banks,” and (3) “purchas[ing] longer-term 
Treasury securities.” Id. 
 7. See Harrell, supra note 1, at 1236-37 (“At the time of this writing we are well 
into the third year of the Great Credit Contraction, with no end in sight despite trillions 
of dollars of remedial ‘stimulus’ and bailout spending.”). 
 8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
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arrangements, where risks are minimized through the structure of the 
clearing mechanisms.10 
This Note will focus on the changes in swap regulation under the 
Reform Act. It will seek to show that the Reform Act captures the safety 
mechanisms present in the extant futures market. In addition, it will 
show that the new regulatory scheme applied to swap transactions will 
address the fundamental problem exposed by the financial crisis: 
inaccurate credit risk forecasting. Finally, this Note will discuss a 
potential risk created by the way clearing organizations, given new 
importance in the Reform Act, are structured. Alternatively stated, an 
examination of the Reform Act reveals that swap markets have adopted 
appropriate features of futures markets in a successful effort to address 
the causes underlying the financial crisis. However, in doing so, the 
Reform Act opens the door to prospective market trouble in the form of 
systemically significant11 swap-clearing firms. 
The amounts of money involved in derivatives activities, of which 
swaps are the largest subset, are staggering. The Bank for International 
Settlements calculated the outstanding notional value of all over-the-
counter (“OTC”) derivatives worldwide at over $600 trillion in 
December 2009.12 However, this figure is separate from the market 
value of the derivative instruments. The notional value of a derivative is 
the “the sum[] underlying the derivatives contract[].”13 This can be the 
amount used to calculate interest payments14 or be the “value of the 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See id. 
 11.  For a discussion on the concept of systemically significant institutions, see 
infra Part III.B. 
 12. Bank for Int’l Settlements, Statistical Annex, 2010 BIS Q. REV. A1, A121 tbl. 
19. 
 13. Mark Levy, Note, Japanese and U.S. Financial Derivatives Markets: 
Recommendations for Loosening Japan’s Tightly Regulated Market, 18 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1970, 1998 n.192 (1995) (“The notional value represents the amount of 
principal that, although never actually changing hands, is the basis upon which the 
interest on a swap or related instrument is calculated. Because notional principle refers 
to the sums underlying the derivatives contracts, not the income streams that 
counterparties are bound to exchange, it is an inaccurate proxy for market value.”); see 
also Jeannette Redmond, Note, State and Local Governmental Entities: In Search Of . . 
. Statutory Authority to Enter into Interest Rate Swap Agreements, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2177, 2178 (“The agreed-upon dollar value is referred to as the ‘notional’ value of the 
swap.”). 
 14. Levy, supra note 13, at 1998 n.192. See generally John D. Finnerty & Mark S. 
Brown, An Overview of Derivatives Litigation, 1994 to 2000, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
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derivative’s underlying assets.”15 Since the value of a derivative is 
linked to these underlying measures, but detached from the need for any 
party to possess or be otherwise influenced by them, the value of the 
derivatives associated with a particular physical market can surpass the 
value of all products in that market.16 In addition, swap transactions are 
typically highly leveraged, because they often require no or relatively 
little money up front.17 These characteristics of derivatives are partially 
what made them so destructive in the 2008 financial crisis.18 
The definition of a derivative is understandably broad: it is a 
“financial product the value of which is derived” from an underlying 
asset or measure.19 The overall concept of derivatives covers extensive 
categories of financial instruments, including options, forwards, futures, 
                                                                                                                 
FIN. L. 131, 138 n.18 (2001) (“The notional value of the swap is usually tied to a 
specific principal amount of the underlying bond.”). 
 15. Notional Value, INVESTORWORDS.COM, http://www.investorwords.com/5930/ 
notional_value.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 16. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 173 (“Because neither counterparty to 
these contracts needed to have any exposure to the underlying subject credit, AIG was 
able to ‘write protection’ for many times the value of the outstanding credit of the 
subject companies themselves.”). Cf. Lecture, Panel Discussion: Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown and the Global Financial Crisis, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 43 (2008) 
(“Think of the CDO market. You have $45 trillion of notional value which only deals 
with $5.9 trillion of debt. So somebody is trading in these derivatives that have no 
attachment to the debt.”). 
 17.  See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-
Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1307 (2010) (“OTC derivatives 
can increase market volatility and the level of systemic risk due to a combination of 
excessive amounts of leverage and low capital requirements.”); see also id. at 1306 
(“Derivatives speculation in turn is linked with a variety of economic ills--including 
increased systemic risk when speculators go bust.” (quoting Lynn A. Stout, How 
Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-Regulating Them Can Prevent 
Another, LOMBARD ST., 4 (July 6, 2009), http://www.finreg21.com/files/finreg21-
finreg21/Lombard%207.pdf. 
 19. ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 12 (3d ed. 2002); 
SIMON JAMES, THE LAW OF DERIVATIVES 2-3 (1999) (“A derivatives transaction is . . . 
‘a bilateral contract or payments exchange whose value derives . . . from the value of an 
underlying asset or underlying rate or index.’”) (quoting GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY 
GROUP OF THE GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPALS 28 
(1993))); see also RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 159 (quoting a similar definition 
articulated in a federal case from the Southern District of Ohio). 
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and swaps.20 Before discussing regulatory changes in swap markets, it is 
important to understand what a swap is and how it relates to other types 
of derivatives. 
The most basic derivative instrument is an option. Options give the 
bearer the right, in exchange for a relatively small upfront payment, to 
trigger either purchase or sale obligations related to an underlying 
asset.21 The holder of this right avoids any loss greater than the upfront 
payment if the contemplated transaction would not be profitable and 
therefore allows the right contained in the option to lapse. Combining 
two opposite options, one giving the right to purchase and the other 
giving the right to sell at a certain price, creates a forward.22 As there is 
typically no upfront payment associated with forwards, they can be 
infinitely leveraged, since the underlying asset is controlled by the 
purchasing party without putting up capital.23 
Unlike options, forwards allocate downside risk to both parties.24 A 
traditional forward transaction is one in which two parties agree to 
exchange an underlying asset in the future for a payment to be made at a 
future date determined at the time the forward contract is concluded.25 In 
response to the CFTC’s regulatory jurisdiction, discussed below, 
forwards are, in practice, often cash settled, meaning that the difference 
in the value between the underlying asset on the closing date and the 
contracted-for price is exchanged, rather than the actual underlying 
asset.26 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See HUDSON, supra note 19, at 12-13; JAMES, supra note 19, at 3. 
 21. See HUDSON, supra note 19, at 14; see also 1 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 94 (2004). 
 22. See HUDSON, supra note 19, at 14, 42. 
 23. Imagine the two up-front payments associated with the two component options 
canceling each other out. See Baker, supra note 18, at 1307; cf. HUDSON, supra note 16, 
at 22 (discussing the risky nature of derivative transactions due to the credit risk that the 
counterparty will be unable to pay); Christian O. Nagler, Note, Derivatives Disclosure 
Requirements: Here We Go Again, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 451 (1997) 
(“Futures, for instance, are highly leveraged derivatives requiring only a small purchase 
price as a percentage of their notional value.”). 
 24. See HUDSON, supra note 19, at 14. 
 25. See JAMES, supra note 19, at 3; see also 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 
§ 1.02[8][B]; FED. RESERVE SYS., TRADING AND CAPITAL-MARKETS ACTIVITIES 
MANUAL § 4310.1 (1998). 
 26. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 67-69. See generally 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 200 (explaining that the CFTC has jurisdiction when 
a derivative contemplates actual future delivery of the underlying asset). 
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More complex than forwards, swaps can be viewed as a collection 
of forward transactions under the overall arrangement of the swap.27 
Swaps take the structure of “an exchange of cash flows” based on some 
notional amount from which the payments to be exchanged are 
calculated.28 A plain vanilla swap exchanges a fixed payment for a 
payment that is variable based on some underlying measure, such as the 
London Inter Bank Offer Rate (“LIBOR”), the prime rate, or some other 
rate.29 But a swap can take any form, including the exchange of two 
different variable rates, as long as the fundamental structure reflects an 
exchange of payments.30 Payments can be exchanged as often or as little 
as the parties desire and contract for, each payment arrangement 
comprising one of the forward transactions constituting the swap.31 
There are two fundamental reasons why parties enter into any 
derivative transaction. The first is to limit a party’s risk and the second 
is to speculate on expected price movements.32 The hedging function of 
a derivative is realized by taking a position in the derivative instrument 
opposite that of the party’s current risk—“constructing a derivative 
product which will increase in value if the underlying risk generates a 
loss.”33 This transfers risk from one party less willing or able to bear it 
to another party more willing or able to bear that risk.34 The speculative 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See HUDSON, supra note 19, at 14 (“All swaps can be analysed as being a string 
of forward contracts in which both parties are contingently liable to fulfill their payment 
obligations depending on the performance of the underlying obligation on a series of 
payment dates.”); JAMES, supra note 19, at 6 (“[S]waps entail a series of payments, and 
can be seen as a number of forward contracts stretching over time.”). 
 28. HUDSON, supra note 19, at 43; see JAMES, supra note 19, at 6; 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 175-77. 
 29. See HUDSON, supra note 19, at 45-46; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 175-
77; see also FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 4325.1. 
 30. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 175; see also FED. RESERVE SYS., supra 
note 25, § 4325.1; HUDSON, supra note 19, at 43-46. 
 31. See HUDSON, supra note 19, at 14; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 175; 
supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 32. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 120, 127; see also HUDSON, supra 
note 19, at 15-19; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 160. 
 33. HUDSON, supra note 19, at 18; see 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 120 
(“[A] hedging transaction . . . entails acquiring [derivatives] that create for the holder an 
obligation opposite to an obligation of that person in a commercial transaction.”). 
 34. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 30-31 (“Hedgers trade to shift the risk of an 
unfavorable event to a counterparty that is better able or more willing to carry that 
risk.”). 
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function of a derivative allows those wishing to take advantage of an 
expected market movement to do so without having to actually enter 
that specific market.35 A speculator could purchase a derivative 
instrument whose value, the change in which the speculator is seeking to 
take advantage of, is based on some underlying asset or measure without 
ever having to actually purchase the asset. Derivatives make either 
hedging or speculative functions easy since, in a cash-settled 
transaction, the arrangement can be benchmarked to the value of an 
asset or measure without either party ever controlling it.36 
I. PRE-REFORM MARKETS 
Although the swap regulations contemplated by the Reform Act are 
new to that market, they build off of derivative regulations pre-dating 
the Reform Act. For this reason, it is useful to examine the regulatory 
structure as it existed before the Reform Act. In general, pre-Reform Act 
derivative markets can be characterized as heavily regulating futures 
transactions, while leaving swaps relatively unregulated. 
A. REGULATOR JURISDICTION 
The Commodities Exchange Act, passed in 1936, established the 
first comprehensive federal government regulations over a wide range of 
different commodities futures.37 However, the CFTC was created later, 
after Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 
in 1974.38 The most fundamental view of the CFTC’s jurisdiction, as 
reformulated by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, is 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See HUDSON, supra note 19, at 16; see also JAMES, supra note 19, at 2-3. 
Opportunities for arbitrage, or taking advantage of price discrepancies between 
different markets, are included here as a form of speculative trading. See HUDSON, 
supra note 19, at 20 (“The use of derivative products makes it possible for market users 
to take advantage of mismatches in prices or market conditions by speculating on the 
underlying financial products without the need to undergo the formalities of 
conventional market trading.”). 
 36. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 37. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (2006). 
 38. See John D. Benson, Comment, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a 
CFTC/SEC Consolidation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1991); see also 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 192. 
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that the CFTC has jurisdiction over futures and futures exchanges.39 
More specifically, the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, provides that the CFTC has 
regulatory jurisdiction over “agreements . . . and transactions involving 
contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery . . . traded or 
executed on a[n exchange].”40 These contracts of sale for future 
delivery, or futures contracts, must be traded on organized exchanges 
approved by the CFTC.41 Under this mandate, the determinate for 
whether a transaction is a forward exempt from the CFTC’s jurisdiction 
or a future subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction, is whether actual delivery 
of the underlying asset is contemplated.42 
However, an agreement’s provision for future delivery does not end 
the inquiry into whether that agreement is a contract of sale for future 
delivery subject to CFTC regulation. A putative forward transaction 
contemplating delivery may meet the exemptive requirements for a cash 
forward, described as “[c]ash commodity contracts for deferred 
shipment or delivery.”43 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Co 
Petro Marketing Group is the foundational case examining this 
exemption for cash forward contracts.44 The Ninth Circuit in this case 
examined all the circumstances surrounding the agreements at issue in 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See Benson, supra note 38, at 1180 (“The CFTC exercises its regulatory 
authority principally by overseeing the efforts of self-regulatory organizations such as 
the futures exchanges.”); see also RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 195. See generally 
Baker, supra note 18, at 1310 (explaining that OTC derivatives are exempt from the 
regulatory scope of the CFTC). Between futures exchanges and unregulated OTC 
markets, there is an intermediary forum of derivative exchange regulated by the CFTC, 
although it is subject to fewer regulations than a full-blown futures exchange. See 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 195-96; see also 7 U.S.C. § 7a (2006) (providing for 
derivative transaction execution facilities, the term for the entities that exist in this 
intermediate category). What is referred to throughout as exchanges are technically 
“designated contract markets,” since “designated contract markets” coincide closely 
with the traditional conception of an exchange. See infra note 135 and accompanying 
text. 
 40. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 41. See In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra 
note 1, at 197-98 (explaining that since cash forwards are exempt from the definition of 
futures, they may be traded outside of an exchange). 
 42. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 197-98, 200. 
 43. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. Grp., Inc., 680 F.2d 
573, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 44. See id. 
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order to determine whether those agreements were futures contracts 
subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction, thus giving birth to a “totality of 
circumstances” test.45 The Co Petro court ultimately found that the 
agreements were “contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery” 
and not cash forward and therefore subject to regulation by the CFTC.46 
The totality of circumstances test was refined in Nagel v. ADM 
Investor Services.47 The Nagel court noted that this test gives 
“controlling significance to a handful of circumstances . . . usually . . . 
ascertained just by reading the contract.”48 These circumstances are 
whether: (1) the terms of the agreement are so specific as to render it 
non-fungible; (2) the parties are participants in an industry related to the 
underlying asset and are therefore not speculators; and (3) delivery 
cannot be deferred forever, and therefore, the purchasing party must 
eventually take delivery.49 Application of these factors addresses the 
stated goal of the CFTC of discouraging speculators from circumventing 
the exchange platform and its restrictions.50 
The Commodity Exchange Act also deals with swaps. The CFTC 
has broadly exempted swap agreements from any regulation with one 
caveat—the parties to the swap must be “eligible swap participants.”51 
Swap agreements are broadly defined and track the definition in the 
bankruptcy code, while the definition of “eligible swap participants,” 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See id. at 581 (“The transaction must be viewed as a whole with a critical eye 
toward its underlying purpose.”). But see Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Erskine, 512 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the totality of the circumstances 
case is no longer the controlling precedent); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Zelener, 373 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2004) (doing away with the totality of circumstances 
and instead focusing exclusively on whether the contracts were fungible). 
 46. Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 581 (“Addressing these circumstances in the light of the 
legislative history of the Act, we conclude that Co Petro’s contracts are ‘contracts of 
sale of a commodity for future delivery.’” (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976))). 
 47. 217 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 48. Id. at 441. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 581 (“The contracts here represent speculative ventures 
in commodity futures which were marketed to those for whom delivery was not an 
expectation. Addressing these circumstances in the light of the legislative history of the 
Act, we conclude that Co Petro’s contracts are ‘contracts of sale of a commodity for 
future delivery.’” (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976))). 
 51. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 64, 333; see also 17 C.F.R. § 35.2 
(2011) (“A swap agreement is exempt from all provisions of the Act . . . provided . . . 
[t]he swap agreement is entered into solely between eligible swap participants at the 
time such persons enter into the swap agreement.”). 
2012] CLEARING SWAPS UNDER DODD-FRANK 199 
 
which is very similar to that of “eligible contract participant” in the 
Commodity Exchange Act, is limited to large, sophisticated 
institutions.52 This regulatory exclusion combines with the statutory 
exclusion for swap transactions entered into between eligible contract 
participants to fully exempt any swap transactions from the regulatory 
jurisdiction of the CFTC.53 As discussed in Part II, the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction regarding swaps is greatly expanded by the Reform Act. In 
many ways, this expansion mirrors the CFTC’s jurisdiction over futures 
and exchanges. 
B. DERIVATIVES MARKETS GENERALLY 
There are two overall types of markets in derivatives: virtually 
unregulated OTC markets and regulated exchange markets.54 In pre-
Reform Act markets, forwards and swaps were traded in the OTC 
markets, which are informal markets where large actors buy and sell 
these types of derivatives.55 Unlike futures, OTC derivatives are not 
traded on organized exchanges.56 As a result, they can be structured to 
include any terms that the parties to the agreement choose and contract 
for.57 This allows OTC derivatives to be used for customized risk 
management since they can respond more perfectly to the needs of the 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 35.1 (2011), with 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12) (2011). 
 53. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(g) (2006); see also 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 
333. 
 54. See Baker, supra note 18, at 1297 (“Derivatives are bought and sold in two 
distinct but related markets: exchange-traded markets and the OTC markets.”). 
 55. See FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, §§ 4310.1, 4325.1; see also 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 166, 175; Baker, supra note 18, at 1301 (“In the 
United States, an essentially two-tiered banking system has evolved, consisting of a 
small group of large international banks and another tier of smaller more local/regional 
banks. It is the former that tend to deal in [OTC] derivatives.”). That the market is 
informal does not mean that it is unstructured. See MARK YALLOP, WHITE PAPER: THE 
FUTURE OF THE OTC MARKETS § 3.16 (2008), available at 
http://www.icap.com/Download.aspx?fileid=%7B2A233C27-8736-406C-BB4A-E3C 
9EBFB1419%7D. 
 56. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 166. See generally FED. RESERVE SYS., 
supra note 22, §§ 4310.1, 4325.1. 
 57. See Baker, supra note 18, at 1300 (“OTC derivatives are often nonstandardized 
financial instruments.”); see also FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 25, § 4310.1 
(“Because they are individually negotiated between counterparties, forwards can be 
customized to meet the specific needs of the contracting parties.”). 
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contracting parties.58 OTC markets also provide an outlet for the trading 
of derivatives with too low a demand for exchange trading.59 This may 
be either because they are new or because they are a niche product, since 
low trading volume limits availability through exchanges.60 
A better understanding of the main risk generally associated with 
OTC-traded derivatives clarifies the implications of entering that 
market. One danger of an OTC market without responsive regulatory 
oversight is that large parties may take on excessively speculative 
positions, thereby jeopardizing their ability to survive unfavorable 
changes in their portfolios.61 As a relatively unregulated sphere of 
economic activity, actors within OTC markets have restricted access to 
information.62 Therefore, besides the potential perils associated with 
speculation, even those parties seeking to hedge in an OTC derivatives 
market may be taking on unrealized risks with the hedging transaction 
itself, since hedging parties may not be able to effectively factor in the 
complete range of their counterparty’s other obligations.63 
The fundamental problem underlying these scenarios relates to the 
creditworthiness of the parties to the transaction. Since a derivative 
always involves some future obligation or payment, the ability of each 
party to perform in the future pursuant to the contract is essential to the 
ultimate consummation of the derivative transaction.64 This is known as 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See Baker, supra note 18, at 1303-04 (“Unlike the standardized derivatives 
traded on exchanges, OTC derivatives allow for customized risk management.”). Cf. 
YALLOP, supra note 55, § 3.9 (“Since exchange contracts are standardised and ‘real 
world’ economic risk is normally non-standardised, traders who use exchanges for 
hedging purposes have to continue to live with the differential between their real 
underlying exposure and the payoff on their hedges. In short, exchange contracts very 
rarely provide a perfect hedge for actual economic risk.”). 
 59. See Baker, supra note 18, at 1305. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. at 1306, 1310. 
 62. See id. at 1306. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 4310.1 (“[C]redit risk in forwards 
arises from the possibility that a contract has a positive replacement cost and the 
counterparty to the contract fails to perform its obligations.”); HUDSON, supra note 19, 
at 68. See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 162 (“Counterparty credit risk is 
the risk of economic loss from the failure of an obligor to perform according to the 
terms and conditions of a contract or agreement.”). 
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counterparty risk, or credit risk.65 As examined below, the Reform Act 
seeks to reduce counterparty risk. With this in mind, swaps will be 
moving to a mandatory clearing model in the post-Reform Act 
regulatory landscape, as discussed in Part II. 
C. EXCHANGE OPERATION 
1. Futures Exchanges 
As previously mentioned, exchanges, as regulated by the CFTC, are 
the medium through which futures are traded.66 Futures are standardized 
agreements for the future delivery of a specified underlying commodity 
on a specified date.67 The specifications of the underlying commodity 
and the mechanics of the actual delivery can be very detailed in order to 
preserve the parties’ expectations about the underlying commodity, and 
to leave no doubt as to the parties’ obligations upon settlement of the 
futures contract.68 Futures contracts with a high level of specificity leave 
only the price to be determined by the actors, who are either hedging or 
speculating through the exchange.69 One of the advantages of engaging 
in futures transactions through an exchange, as opposed to using an 
OTC forward, is the elimination of the risk that the CFTC would find 
                                                                                                                 
 65.  Id. at 162 (“Counterparty credit risk is the risk of economic loss from the 
failure of an obligor to perform according to the terms and conditions of a contract or 
agreement.”); see FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 4310.1 (“[C]redit risk in 
forwards arises from the possibility that a contract has a positive replacement cost and 
the counterparty to the contract fails to perform its obligations.”); HUDSON, supra note 
19, at 68. 
 66. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text; see also FED. RESERVE SYS., 
supra note 25, § 4320.1; 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 150-51 (“As indicated 
earlier, futures trading where the general public has access must generally take place on 
a[n exchange] . . . that has received designation as such by the CFTC.”). Some options 
contracts are also traded on exchanges. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 18, at 763. 
 67. FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 4320.1; see also RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra 
note 1, at 167. 
 68. See generally NYMEX Rulebook, CME GRP., http://www.cmegroup.com/rule 
book/NYMEX/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter NYMEX] (listing 
the actual contracts traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange). 
 69. See FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 4320.1. 
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that the transactions meet the requirements for exchange-trading, 
potentially subjecting the parties to liability for evading exchanges.70 
A party holding a futures contract through the settlement date will 
have to either deliver or take delivery of the underlying commodity, or 
cash settle the contract, depending on the type of future. 71 Prior to the 
settlement date, a party can avoid their delivery or cash settlement 
obligations under a futures contract by either selling the contract, or by 
entering into offsetting transactions on the exchange.72 For example, a 
party holding a long position consisting of one futures contract requiring 
it to take delivery of a commodity could offset by acquiring one short 
position contract requiring it to deliver the same commodity, thereby 
canceling out either obligation. The difference between the price the 
contract was originally bought for and the price the contract was sold for 
before the settlement date constitutes the trader’s profit (or loss).73 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See infra text accompanying note 75 (discussing “legal risk”). Cf. 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 258 (“Forward contracts must therefore be carefully 
drafted to avoid being categorized as futures agreements which are subject to CFTC 
regulation.”). 
 71. Cf. id. at 167 (“[F]utures trading ‘generally involves mechanisms that permit 
the parties to avoid delivery, either by cash settlement or entering into an offsetting 
transaction.’” (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, No. 03-C-
4346, 2003 WL 22284295 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2003))). Compare NYMEX, supra note 68, 
ch. 220 (“The provisions of these rules shall apply to all natural gas bought and sold for 
future delivery on the Exchange with delivery at the Henry Hub.” (emphasis added)), 
with NYMEX, supra note 68, ch. 251 (“The provisions of these rules shall apply to all 
contracts bought or sold on the Exchange for cash settlement based on the Floating 
Price.” (emphasis added)). 
 72. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 317 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (“Trading in futures seldom results in physical delivery of the subject 
commodity, since the obligations are often extinguished by offsetting transactions that 
produce a net profit or loss.” (quoting Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 
308, 318 n.14 (6th Cir. 1998))); see also RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 167 
(“[F]utures trading ‘generally involves mechanisms that permit the parties to avoid 
delivery, either by cash settlement or entering into an offsetting transaction.’” (quoting 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, No. 03-C-4346, 2003 WL 22284295 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2003))). 
 73. See Erskine, 512 F.3d at 317 (“Trading in futures seldom results in physical 
delivery of the subject commodity, since the obligations are often extinguished by 
offsetting transactions that produce a net profit or loss.” (quoting Andersons, Inc. v. 
Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 318 n. 14 (6th Cir. 1998))). 
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The exchanges that futures are traded on are self-regulatory 
organizations able to formulate and enforce their own rules.74 They are 
structured to eliminate the risks associated with forwards trading—in 
particular, counterparty risk.75 Futures exchanges accomplish this, 
partly, through three mechanisms: (1) recognition only of members of 
the exchange; (2) margin requirements; and (3) daily mark to market.76 
Vetting potential membership and only recognizing members as entities 
able to trade on the exchange are means of ensuring that exchange 
participants are qualified.77 In order to certify that the parties to a futures 
contract are not reliant on credit, margin rules require members to post 
an additional margin deposit, typically a small fraction of the total value 
of the futures contracts held, on their positions in the exchange.78 
Finally, the values of futures contract positions are recalculated in the 
daily mark to market.79 Any increase in value for a party is deposited 
into that party’s margin account and taken from its counterparty’s 
margin account, which must then be replenished in order to continue 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 174 (explaining the statutory 
mandate of exchange, or “contract markets,” to formulate and enforce their own rules, 
subject to CFTC guidelines). However, these rules must be filed with the CFTC and 
may be disapproved of. See id. at 496-97. 
 75. See FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 4320.1 (“Unlike OTC derivative 
contracts, the credit risk associated with a futures contract is minimal.”); see also 2 
PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 763 
(2004) (“[Exchanges] generally impose other financial requirements on their members, 
designed primarily to protect the integrity of their futures . . . contracts by reducing the 
risk of default on obligations incurred by traders in the market.”). Trading on an 
exchange also eliminates “legal risk,” which is the risk that an OTC transaction will be 
determined by the CFTC to be a futures contract, thus subjecting the parties to liability 
and jeopardizing their transaction. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 169. 
 76. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. Exchanges also act as a 
counterparty to all transactions on the exchange, effectively guaranteeing every 
transaction from the perspective of members. See FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 
4320.1; see also infra text accompanying notes 91-92. 
 77. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note21, at 153 (“The rules of the derivatives 
exchange set qualifications for membership that generally focus on matters of integrity 
and financial responsibility.”); see also RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 1, at 211. 
 78. See FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 4320.1 (discussing margin 
requirements associated with futures); see also 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 
111 (discussing the origins and purpose of the margin requirement). 
 79. See 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 75, at 765. 
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satisfying the margin requirements of the exchange.80 The gaining party 
can withdraw the excess funds from its own margin account to the 
extent that the margin account satisfies the exchange’s margin 
requirements after the withdrawal.81 All these measures serve to reduce 
the risk that one party will be unable to perform at the settlement of the 
contract, or at least to catch a credit risk early in the event a party fails to 
replenish a diminished margin account.82 
These counterparty risk reducing mechanisms operating within 
exchanges structure both the interactions between exchange participants 
and those of non-members seeking to trade on the exchange. Futures 
commission merchants (“FCMs”) are the primary means for outside 
customers to access the speculative or hedging functions of the 
exchange.83 The Commodity Exchange Act defines a FCM as:  
 
[A]n individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust that (A) is engaged in 
soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future 
delivery on or subject to the rules of any [exchange] . . . ; and (B) in, or in connection 
with such solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or 
property (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades 
or contracts that result or may result therefrom.84  
 
This definition clarifies the function of FCMs. They act as the 
intermediary between their public customers and the exchange, 
executing trade orders on their customers’ behalf and ensuring that 
margin and other requirements are satisfied on behalf of their 
customers.85 This relationship takes the following structure: the 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 111-12. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 153, 763 (“[Exchanges] generally impose . . . requirements on their 
members, designed primarily to protect the integrity of their futures . . . contracts by 
reducing the risk of default on obligations incurred by traders in the market.”); see also 
FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, § 4320.1 (discussing how the mechanisms of a 
futures exchange reduce credit risk). 
 83. See id. at 195 (“The lion’s share of sales promotion, and all of the performance 
of direct customer services . . . , are undertaken by futures commission merchants and 
their introducing brokers or associated persons.” (emphasis omitted)); see also 
TIMOTHY J. SNIDER, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES & OPTIONS MARKETS 
§ 4.01 (2d ed. 1997). 
 84. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(20) (2006). 
 85. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 195-96; see also 1st Am. Disc. 
Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 222 F.3d 1008, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
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customer makes a margin deposit with its FCM in an amount that at 
least meets the exchange’s minimum margin requirements.86 The FCM, 
in turn, makes its own margin deposit with a clearing organization 
associated with the exchange for trades to be cleared, which the FCM 
then presents to the clearing organization.87 
Every exchange has an overall clearing agency that clears all trades 
made on the exchange and ensures that they have been properly entered 
into.88 Membership in the clearing agency is separate from membership 
in the exchange.89 An FCM can present its own trades to the clearing 
agency to be cleared if it becomes a clearing member of the exchange it 
operates within; however, clearing membership subjects the FCM to a 
higher regulatory burden.90 In the event that an FCM chooses not to 
become a clearing member, it must seek the services of an independent 
clearing member to present the FCM’s trades on its behalf.91 
Every entity involved with a transaction in a futures contract, from 
initial order to final clearance, guarantees that the transaction will be 
completed as contemplated.92 In a futures contract transaction on an 
                                                                                                                 
(“An FCM is the commodity market’s equivalent of a securities brokerage house . . . 
.”). 
 86. See id. at 450 (explaining that although margin posted must be at least the 
minimum required by the exchange for the particular type of transaction, an FCM can 
set a higher margin requirement for its own interactions with customers). 
 87. See id. (“The clearing margin is an amount that a FCM having membership in 
the clearing organization must deposit with the clearing agency on trades presented to 
the clearing agency for clearance and guarantee.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 88. See id. at 189 (“Every [exchange] maintains a mechanism either within its own 
organization or through a separate entity for the daily clearance of all futures 
transactions.”); SNIDER, supra note 83, § 2.01 (“Every commodity futures exchange in 
the United States has a clearing house and requires that futures contracts made on the 
exchange be submitted to that clearing house for clearance.”). 
 89. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 190 (“[M]embership in the clearing 
house is a separate status from membership in the [exchange].”). 
 90. See SNIDER, supra note 83, § 4.05; see also 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 
21, at 490 (discussing the higher capital requirements for clearing firms since they must 
also guarantee the transactions they clear). 
 91. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 190 (“Members of the [exchange] 
who are not also members of the clearing house accomplish clearance by tendering their 
trades to a clearing member, which then submits them to the clearing house.”). 
 92. See id. at 451; see also SNIDER, supra note 83, § 2.09 (“The clearing house of a 
commodity futures exchange guarantees the payment of variation margin to clearing 
members with net gains on positions in their accounts at the clearing house even it if is 
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exchange “there may be as many as four guarantors . . . - the customer, 
the . . . FCM, the clearing member, and the clearing agency.”93 This is 
the strength of the exchange model. In this way, exchanges practically 
eliminate counterparty risk and give an incentive to exchange 
participants to examine the credit of those they interact with, whether an 
FCM taking on a customer or a clearing agency accepting a new 
member. 
2. Structured Swaps Pre-Reform 
Although swaps are classified as an OTC financial instrument, they 
have not been, in the pre-Reform Act period, necessarily arranged for in 
an anarchical market structure. Today, futures exchanges provide some 
clearing services for swap parties and even organize some of their 
futures to utilize swap transactions as their underlying measures. 
However, before the Reform Act, most swap transactions were 
conducted in the informal OTC market and were not cleared by a central 
party in any way.94 
The CME Group, which controls both the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (“NYMEX”) and the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”), 
provides an example of cleared OTC swaps. This group offers clearing 
services to parties that have contracted for a credit default swap.95 
Entities that wish to clear credit default swap transactions through the 
CME Group must be clearing members—members of the central 
clearing agency of the exchange—and meet more stringent requirements 
than clearing members seeking to clear only futures exchange-traded 
                                                                                                                 
unable to collect all the variation margin owed to it by clearing members with net losses 
on their positions.”). 
 93. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 21, at 451. 
 94. See Frank D’Souza et al., Illuminating the Need for Regulation in Dark 
Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
473, 483 (2010) (“Because the vast majority of OTC transactions are settled bilaterally 
between the counterparties, rather than through clearing houses, there is no central 
counterparty similar to what exists for exchange-traded derivatives.”). 
 95. See Credit Products, CME GRP., http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/cds/index. 
Html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). A credit default swap is created when a party, 
seeking to hedge the default risk associated with loans it has made to third parties, 
agrees to pay a certain sum to its counterparty. See Frank D’Souza et al., supra note 94, 
at 484. The counterparty’s payment obligation is triggered if the loan goes bad. Id. The 
asset underlying the swap is the creditworthiness of the third-party borrower against 
whose default the lender is attempting to hedge. Id. 
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products.96 In keeping with the goal of clearing to provide layers of 
safety to mitigate counterparty risk,97 the requirements for clearing 
members wishing to clear credit default swaps are stringent: over $500 
million in capital and a thorough review of business operations, 
including any disciplinary history.98 Even when clearing members meet 
these requirements, only credit default swaps meeting certain standards 
are eligible to be accepted for clearing by the CME Group.99 Similar to 
customers in futures transactions, parties to such standardized cleared 
credit default swaps can conduct their transactions through FCMs 
which, if they are not themselves clearing members, in turn transact 
through clearing members.100 
Exchanges also have futures structured to reflect swap transactions. 
CBOT lists interest rate swap futures in five, seven, ten, and thirty-year 
time increments.101 As their underlying measure, these CBOT futures 
use average U.S. dollar swap rates, as reported by the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”), which are calculated 
using a notional value of $100,000.102 The result is not as simple as 
applying the average rate to the future’s notional value. 103 Instead, the 
value of the future is calculated by manipulating the average reported 
rate, and multiplying the result by the notional value of $100,000.104 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See CDS Clearing Member Requirements, CME GRP., http://www.cmegroup. 
com/trading/cds/cds-clearing-member-requirements.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 97. See About Central Counterparties, CME GRP., http://www.cmegroup.com/ 
clearing/cme-clearing-overview/about-central-counterparties.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2010) (“The presence of a central counterparty like CME Clearing is an important 
customer advantage compared to over-the-counter markets. CME Clearing’s status as 
the central counterparty allows it to deliver operational and financial efficiencies to 
market participants, while reducing the risk inherent in trading activities.”). 
 98. CDS Clearing Member Requirements, CME GRP., supra note 96. 
 99. See Cleared OTC CDS Buy-side Solution Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), 
CME GRP., 4 (July 2010), http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/cds/files/cds-buyside-
faq.pdf. 
 100. See id. at 3. 
 101. See CBOT Rulebook, CME GRP., http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT 
/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (listing all interest rate products offered on the 
CBOT exchange). 
 102. See id. ch. 23; ISDAFIX, ISDA, http://www.isda.org/fix/isdafix.html (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 103. See CBOT Rulebook, supra note 101. 
 104. See id. 
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II.  POST-REFORM MARKETS 
Before the Reform Act, the CFTC had jurisdiction over all futures 
and futures exchanges, which included forward transactions that should 
have been completed through a futures exchange.105 Similarly, the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction is expanded by the Reform Act to include all 
swaps.106 The Reform Act simply amends the Commodity Exchange Act 
to insert the term “swaps” as being within the CFTC’s regulatory 
jurisdiction.107 The details of how the new swap markets are structured 
are fundamental to understanding how the Reform Act balances the need 
to improve the soundness of the swap market with the OTC, and 
therefore individually structured, nature of swaps. 
A. NEW REGULATOR JURISDICTION 
Section 722 of the Reform Act expands the jurisdictional mandate 
of the CFTC in order to allow it to regulate swaps and swap execution 
facilities in a framework that imitates the safety and soundness features 
of futures exchanges.108 It further directs that no swap will be either 
considered as insurance or regulated by state insurance regulators.109 
Section 762 of the Reform Act repeals the sections of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act that prohibited the SEC from regulating security-based 
swap agreements.110 Corresponding changes were made to The 
Securities Act of 1933 and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in 
order to expand the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction over security-based 
swaps.111 
Section 712 of the Reform Act reviews the changes in the mandates 
of regulators.112 Both the CFTC and the SEC are directed to coordinate 
and consult in formulating and implementing new rules with an aim to 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See supra notes 39, 43 and accompanying text.  
 106. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203 § 722, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. This section amends § 2 of the Commodity Exchange Act in order to 
effectuate these changes. See id.; 7 U.S.C. § 2(a), (c)(2)(A) (2006). 
 109. Dodd-Frank Act § 722(b). 
 110. Id. § 762. 
 111. See id. § 762(c)-(d). 
 112. See id. § 712. 
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consistency in regulations across their respective jurisdictions.113 The 
authority of the CFTC to promulgate rules and regulations regarding 
oversight of financial instruments is expanded to include swaps, swap 
dealers and major swap participants (and persons associated with either), 
swap data repositories, and derivative clearing organizations 
(“DCOs”).114 Jurisdiction with respect to DCOs is extended to include 
“swaps, persons associated with a swap dealer or major swap 
participant, eligible [swap] contract participants, [and] swap execution 
facilities.”115 The SEC has its authority similarly clarified to include 
security-based swaps and related elements, similar to those provided for 
swaps as now regulated by the CFTC. 
Reviewing these concepts as they are defined is essential to 
understanding the scope of the legislation. But before examining their 
statutory definitions, it is important to remember that, under the Reform 
Act, the CFTC can promulgate rules altering the definitions of swap, 
swap dealer, major swap participant or eligible contract participant, in 
order to capture transactions designed to evade the restrictions of the 
Reform Act.116 A swap is extensively defined in Section 721 of the 
Reform Act. The fundamental distillation of the definition is that a swap 
is a transaction that exchanges payments based on the value of 
underlying measures or assets, and transfers the financial risk associated 
with a change in the value of the underlying measures or assets, but 
transfers neither any ownership in, nor liability that incorporates the 
financial risk of, an underlying asset.117 The definition also includes any 
transfer or agreement that comes to be commonly termed a swap.118 This 
definition is compatible with general non-statutory definitions of a 
swap.119 Security-based swaps and their associated concepts, similar to 
those for “regular” swaps now regulated by the CFTC, are defined in the 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. § 712(a)(1)-(2). 
 114. See id. § 712(a)(1). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. § 721(c). 
 117. See id. § 721(a)(21). That is, a swap is a transaction that exchanges payments 
based on the value of the underlying measure or assets. But a swap agreement does not 
contemplate that any party will either take any ownership in an underlying asset or 
undertake any liability regarding an underlying asset (other than the payment 
obligations arising through the swap agreement). 
 118. See id. 
 119. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934. A security-based swap is 
fundamentally a swap that is based on a narrow security index or single 
loan or security.120 
The Reform Act creates new categories of actors within swap 
markets. Unless an insured depository institution enters into a swap with 
a customer in connection with giving that customer a loan, an actor is a 
swap dealer if it: 
(i) [H]olds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii) makes a market in 
swaps; (iii) regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an 
ordinary course of business for its own account; or (iv) engages in 
any activity causing the person to be commonly known in the trade 
as a dealer or market maker in swaps . . . . 121 
This definition also does not include those who enter into swaps for their 
own account, “but not as a part of a regular business,” or those who only 
engage in a de minimis amount of trading.122 
A major swap participant is a person who is not a swap dealer, but 
maintains a substantial position for hedging, the standard for which is to 
be set by the CFTC, whose position is so big as to create counterparty 
risk that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial markets, or 
who is a financial entity not subject to any federal banking regulator’s 
capital requirements, but is highly leveraged.123 Businesses that 
primarily engage in financing are excluded from this definition.124 
Likewise, major security-based swap participants, regulated by the SEC, 
must meet similar conditions. 
Persons associated with either a swap dealer or a major swap 
participant are limited to employees, agents, or officers of either type 
who are involved in “solicitation or acceptance of swaps” or supervision 
of the same, unless that person’s function is purely clerical.125 A swap 
data repository is defined as “any person that collects and maintains 
information or records with respect to transactions or positions in, or the 
terms and conditions of, swaps entered into by third parties for the 
purpose of providing a centralized recordkeeping facility for swaps.”126 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See Dodd-Frank Act § 761(a)(6) (2010). 
 121. Id. § 721(a)(21). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. § 721(a)(16). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. § 721(a)(2). 
 126. Id. § 721(a)(21). 
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A DCO is particularly important in the scheme formulated by the 
Reform Act. The definition of a DCO is unchanged by the Reform Act. 
The Commodity Exchange Act defines a DCO as any organization that 
allows the parties to a transaction to substitute the credit of the DCO for 
the credit of the parties, provides settlement or netting of obligations, or 
otherwise arranges for services that transfer the risk arising out of the 
transaction.127 
Similarly, the definition of eligible contract participant is unaltered 
from its extant definition in the United States Code. An eligible contract 
participant can be a financial institution, insurance, or investment 
company.128 Alternatively, it can be a corporation with at least $10 
million in assets, or only $1 million if the purpose of the derivatives 
transaction is to hedge against a risk.129 An individual can be an eligible 
contract participant if he or she has at least $10 million in assets, or only 
$5 million if the purpose of the transaction is to “manage the risk 
associated with an asset . . . or liability.”130 The conditions that certain 
other entities have to meet in order to be considered eligible contract 
participants are also listed in the section.131 
Finally, the actual entities that organize some swap trades are 
defined. A swap execution facility is “a trading system or platform in 
which multiple participants have the ability to execute or trade swaps by 
accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants . . . .”132 This 
definition includes any entity that “facilitates the execution of swaps 
between persons.”133 However, a swap execution “is not a designated 
contract market.”134 Instead, a designated contract market most closely 
resembles the traditional conception of a futures exchange.135 Boards of 
trade may be designated as contract markets by the CFTC if they meet 
                                                                                                                 
 127. 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(9) (2006). 
 128. Id. § 1a(12) 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Designated Contract Markets 
(DCMS), CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/ 
index.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (“DCMs are most like traditional futures 
exchanges, which may allow access to their facilities by all types of traders, including 
retail customers.”). 
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certain criteria; however, the requirements for a designated contract 
market are altered by the Reform Act.136 
B. NEW STRUCTURE FOR SWAPS 
Moving forward, the CFTC will exercise significant control over 
the entities that operate within swap transactions. DCOs face a higher 
regulatory burden than under the old regulatory regime.137 A DCO must 
register with the CFTC, or else using jurisdictional means138 to further 
any swap transaction is unlawful.139 Each DCO is further required to 
appoint an officer to oversee compliance with the Commodity Exchange 
Act, as modified by the Reform Act. The core principles guiding the 
operations of DCOs are also expanded, including (1) increasing the 
requisite DCO’s financial resources; (2) publicly disclosing 
requirements for membership in the DCO; (3) more stringently 
managing and monitoring the risks associated with the swaps the DCO 
is clearing; and (4) holding member funds in such a way as to minimize 
risk of loss or delay in access by the DCO.140 
A swap execution facility that has registered with the CFTC may 
make any swap available for trading, as long as the swap product is not 
readily susceptible to manipulation, but it too must comply with certain 
safety requirements.141 The core principles of swap execution facilities 
must consider information gathering, reporting such information, and 
preventing manipulation or abuse of swap markets.142 Designated 
contract markets face similar obligations under the Reform Act.143 Any 
swap made available for trading on either a swap execution facility or a 
board of trade designated as a contract market must be traded within 
such a forum. Otherwise parties are free to conclude a swap bilaterally 
and present it to a DCO for clearing, if required or desired.144 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); Dodd-Frank Act § 735. 
 137. See Dodd-Frank Act § 725. 
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Swap dealers and major swap participants are both required to 
register with the CFTC and meet CFTC-set margin requirements for 
uncleared swap transactions.145 The CFTC can impose minimum capital 
requirements and rules governing activities on swap dealers and major 
swap participants, as long as they are not banks. Banks must comply 
with existing minimum capital requirements set by their banking 
regulator and the CFTC must consult with the relevant banking regulator 
in promulgating rules pertaining to such swap dealers or major swap 
participants.146 They also face information-gathering and reporting 
requirements.147 
The new swap clearing model will mirror the risk-reducing features 
extant in futures exchanges: (1) clearing transactions; (2) reporting 
transaction data; (3) requiring margin accounts; and (4) imposing 
position limits. 
1. Mandatory Clearing 
Section 723 of the Reform Act provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful 
for any person to engage in a swap unless that person submits such swap 
for clearing to a [DCO].”148 The only swaps exempt from this clearing 
requirement are swaps in which one of the parties is attempting to hedge 
against other risk, is not a financial entity, and reports to the CFTC 
“how it generally meets financial obligations related to swaps.”149 Even 
so, the swap may be cleared at the discretion of the hedging party.150 A 
financial entity is defined as being, inter alia, a swap dealer, a security-
based swap dealer, a major swap participant, or a major security-based 
swap participant, but the CFTC can choose to exempt banks with assets 
of $10 billion or less.151 A DCO must consider swaps for acceptance 
regardless of whether they were concluded bilaterally or were executed 
on an unaffiliated swap execution facility or designated contract 
market.152 
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However, the ultimate determination of which swaps are required 
to be cleared rests with the CFTC. All swaps or categories of swaps that 
a DCO plans on accepting or lists for clearing are to be reviewed by the 
CFTC, which determines whether those swaps are required to be 
cleared.153 The CFTC will consider a number of factors, including the 
effect of the proposed transaction on systemic risk and the risk of either 
counterparty or clearing organization defaulting on obligations.154 
Eventually, within one year of enactment, the CFTC will promulgate 
rules to guide DCOs in deciding which swaps must be cleared pursuant 
to the Reform Act, but all swaps will remain subject to such review by 
the CFTC.155 However, the CFTC cannot force a DCO to clear a swap if 
it would threaten the financial integrity of the DCO.156 Finally, all swaps 
of a type required to be cleared that are concluded between a swap 
dealer or a major swap participant and a counterparty that is neither a 
swap dealer nor a major swap participant, are to be cleared at a DCO of 
the counterparty’s choosing.157 If a swap not required to be cleared is 
concluded between a swap dealer or a major swap participant and a 
counterparty that is neither a swap dealer nor a major swap participant, 
that counterparty may insist that the swap be cleared at a DCO of its 
own choosing.158 
2. Reporting Requirements 
Information reporting requirements are thoroughly covered and 
imposed upon several entities in the Reform Act. Section 727 requires 
that every cleared swap, whether required to be cleared or not, be 
reported to the public in as close to real time as technologically 
possible.159 This section also mandates that every swap, cleared or 
uncleared, be reported to a swap data repository.160 Swap data 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. § 727. In the event the cleared swap was not required to be cleared, the 
public reporting should not disclose the market positions of any person. See id.; see also 
id. § 729 (“Each swap that is not accepted for clearing by any derivatives clearing 
organization shall be reported to a swap data repository.”). 
 160. See id. 
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repositories, as provided for in Section 728, collect data sent to them, 
confirm receipt of the same, make data available to either the CFTC or 
the public (as directed by the CFTC), and protect the privacy of the 
parties about whom information is collected.161 Any swap traded on a 
swap execution facility or designated contract market must be reported 
by the trading forum.162 Even large participants in the swap market face 
reporting requirements. If a large trader exceeds either a daily limit or a 
position limit set by the CFTC, they may not trade in any swap 
determined by the CFTC to perform a significant price discovery 
function regarding the swap markets, unless they meet reporting and 
record-keeping requirements set by the CFTC.163 
3. Margin Requirements 
Before the Reform Act, the CFTC was not authorized to impose 
margin levels on registered entities.164 However, the Reform Act 
significantly expands the CFTC’s authority in this area.165 If a registered 
entity has failed to respond to a CFTC request to alter its own rules, the 
CFTC may impose such rule changes with regard to, inter alia, margin 
requirements. But such rules must (1) be limited to protecting the 
financial integrity of a DCO; (2) be focused on risk management 
purposes; and (3) not “set specific margin amounts.”166 The Reform Act 
also directs DCOs to utilize appropriately sized margin requirements to 
limit the risk associated with clearing certain trades.167 
4. Position Limits 
Section 737 expands the position limit provisions in the 
Commodity Exchange Act to include “swaps that perform or affect a 
significant price discovery function with respect to registered 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See id. § 728. 
 162. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 163. See Dodd-Frank Act § 730. 
 164. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7)(C) (2000) (“Such rules, regulations, or orders may 
specify changes with respect to such matters as . . . other trading requirements, 
excepting the setting of levels of margin.”). 
 165. See Dodd-Frank Act § 736. 
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 167. See id. § 725(c). 
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entities.”168 The purpose of these position limits is to prevent excessive 
speculation that results in “sudden or unreasonable [price] 
fluctuations.”169 In determining whether a swap meets the significant 
price discovery requirement, the CFTC is directed to examine, inter 
alia: the risk that the swap contract could be used to arbitrage between 
markets, the possibility of the trading in the swap contract materially 
affecting another contract traded on a regulated market, and whether the 
price of the swap contract is used as a frequent and recurrent basis for 
determining the price of other contracts traded on an organized 
exchange.170 The CFTC also has the authority to establish aggregate 
limits on the number of positions any person can hold “in contracts 
based upon the same underlying commodity.”171 Genuine hedging 
transactions are exempt from the speculative position limits, but not 
from the limits on holding contracts with the same underlying 
commodity.172 
C. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES TO THE PRE-REFORM EXCHANGE 
MODEL 
The new regulatory structure for swaps adapts the mechanism used 
by futures exchanges to the distinctive nature of swap markets. One of 
the great advantages of OTC swap transactions is that they allow the 
parties to structure their transaction and contract to precisely reflect their 
desired terms, allowing for highly customizable risk management.173 
The Reform Act forces swap market participants to trade swap products 
offered on a swap execution facility or designated contract market on 
such forums, and allows swap execution facilities and designated 
contract markets to choose which swap products to offer for trade.174 
This permits the market to determine which swap transactions can be 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Id. § 737. 
 169. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a) (2006) (“Excessive speculation in any commodity under 
contracts of sale of such commodity for future delivery made on or subject to the rules 
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 170. See Dodd-Frank Act § 737. 
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 173. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra notes 138, 141 and accompanying text. 
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successfully standardized and moved to a more organized platform, 
while preserving the flexibility of the OTC markets for others. For 
example, a swap product for which there is a large enough market to 
make pricing mechanisms effective would be more attractive to formal 
execution platforms.175 
Other considerations are tied to this partial shift to formally 
organized swap markets. Swap transactions standardized in such a shift 
will have only the flexibility in terms as they are presented by different 
swap execution facilities. As a result of this lack of flexibility, the only 
meaningful metric that will fluctuate or be negotiated is the price of such 
products.176 Finally, like trading futures on an exchange, executing a 
swap transaction through a swap execution facility or a designated 
contract market and clearing it through a DCO, reduces legal risk by 
providing certainty that the parties will not later be found to have 
entered into an inappropriate transaction.177 
The elemental similarity between futures exchanges and the new 
clearing model for swaps is that they both are structured to respond to 
and reduce counterparty risk. The most significant method by which 
they do this is by interposing a clearing organization—a DCO—for the 
credit of the parties and in order to ensure that transactions are 
completed as contemplated.178 Under the Reform Act, DCOs clearing 
swaps import margin requirements from futures exchanges, but they are 
abandoning membership requirements.179 DCOs clearing swaps must 
consider any swap for clearing, even if not executed on an affiliated 
swap execution facility or designated contract market.180 This looser 
access to DCOs implies that there will be a limited role for a swap-
market analogue to FCMs. Instead, parties may access DCOs on their 
own in order to present trades for clearing. This is consistent with the 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See Andrew M. McKenzie et al., Unbiasedness and Market Efficiency Tests of 
the U.S. Rice Futures Market, 24 R. OF AGRIC. ECON. 474, 475 (2002) (discussing the 
idea that a thinly traded market will result in less perfect pricing mechanisms). 
 176. See FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 177. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 70 and accompanying text. To a lesser extent, 
clearing a swap that parties believe is not traded on a swap execution facility or 
designated contract market provides similar legal certainty. See id. 
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nature of OTC swap markets, where a broad range of parties 
individually negotiate the terms of their transactions. 
IV. MARKET IMPACT OF REFORMS 
A. ADDRESSING PROBLEMS CAUSING THE CURRENT CRISIS 
Partly underlying hesitancy to lend is the memory of the cause of 
the crisis—misperceptions about the creditworthiness of 
counterparties.181 The measures promulgated by the Reform Act target 
the counterparty risk inherent in swap transactions in an effort to prevent 
such a credit crisis from occurring again. In doing this, the Reform Act 
formulates a comprehensive two-prong attack on counterparty risk in 
order to make the swaps market more stable and safety oriented. 
The first prong deals with information asymmetries in swap 
markets. Before the Reform Act, a party’s portfolio of OTC positions 
was not institutionally reported, meaning that the extent and nature of 
their exposures were unavailable to potential swap counterparties.182 In 
general, markets function as information amalgamating mechanisms.183 
Markets incorporate information available to them and translate it into 
prices and other market indicators.184 It follows that the more 
information a market has, the more its prices and conditions will 
accurately reflect the true “value” of the priced good or service.185 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. Coupled with this concern is the 
realization by lenders that, given the very low interest rates prevalent in the market, 
they can obtain a better (risk-free) return by purchasing Treasury securities than by 
lending. See Quantitative Easing Explained, BANK OF ENGLAND, http://www.bank 
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As previously discussed, the Reform Act requires extensive 
reporting of swap positions.186 Virtually every swap and its parties must 
be reported. If cleared, the swap must be reported by the clearing 
organization in real-time; if uncleared, then the swap must be reported 
only to a swap data repository. In this way, Congress is forcing the 
participants in the market to make information about their individual 
activities and general movements in the swap markets available. 
Especially considering the (technically) sophisticated nature of eligible 
swap participants, this increase of information should allow participants 
in the swap market to make more informed and appropriate pricing and 
contract entry decisions. More importantly, the wide-reaching reporting 
requirements will assist clearing organizations and swap dealers in 
determining the default risk of potential counterparties. 
The movement of certain swap products to swap execution 
facilities and designated contract markets is part of the increase of 
information available to the market. The facilities’ reporting 
requirements add to the information mix available to the market.187 
Additionally, by standardizing swaps amenable to the process, trading 
forums give swap markets some normalized measure of the state of the 
markets, since the standardized contracts will fluctuate only on price.188 
In fact, the Reform Act specifies that the goal of trading swaps on swap 
execution facilities is to “promote pre-trade price transparency in the 
swaps market.”189 Monitoring for market manipulation by these trading 
forums should also aid swap markets to function properly.190 
This leads to the second prong of the solution to counterparty risk-
clearing. The Reform Act requires virtually all swaps to be available for 
clearing at one party’s discretion, and requires clearing of what should 
ultimately prove to be a substantial majority of swaps.191 The guarantee 
provided by clearing services, especially considering new margin 
requirements associated with clearing, provides a strong response to 
counterparty risk.192 Even if a counterparty defaults, the intervening 
institutional swap market entities will complete the transaction from the 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.  
 187. See Dodd-Frank Act § 733. 
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perspective of the non-defaulting party.193 The Reform Act also 
mandates that all swaps concluded with a swap dealer or major swap 
participant, except those meeting the hedging exemption, be cleared, 
thus ensuring that large participants in the market will have their trades 
scrutinized and guaranteed by a DCO as a third party.194 However, this 
arrangement pins the underlying soundness of swap markets onto the 
creditworthiness and financial management abilities of swap clearing 
organizations or DCOs. 
Finally, the hedging exemption to mandatory swap clearing195 may 
be susceptible to the same gray areas as the cash-forward contract 
exemption for forwards and futures in the pre-Reform Act period.196 The 
result would be that swap markets would face similar difficulties as 
cash-forward markets do in interpreting the “totality of circumstances” 
test used to determine when forward contracts should have been 
concluded through a futures exchange.197 But the possibility exists that 
the differences between the two regulatory structures will prevent such 
an outcome. 
For example, by evading the determination that a contract is 
properly a future, a party to a forward contract evaded all regulation by 
the CFTC.198 In contrast, avoiding the clearing requirements of the 
Reform Act by meeting the hedging exemption does not remove the 
transaction from examination by the CFTC. The CFTC is authorized to 
regulate all swap transactions, regardless of whether they are cleared or 
not.199 Parties to a swap seeking the exemption must be genuinely 
attempting to hedge and, even so, must still report how they meet 
financial obligations to the CFTC and report the transaction to a swap 
data repository.200 Therefore, although a party to an exempt swap avoids 
the expenses associated with clearing the swap, the regulatory difference 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See id.; see also supra notes 75, 148-58 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 148-58 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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is not as stark as in the analogous forward and futures market situation. 
This may make parties less eager to avoid clearing requirements. 
B. A NEW PROBLEM: SYSTEMICALLY SIGNIFICANT SWAP CLEARING 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Even as the Reform Act is moving towards solutions for some of 
the causes of the financial crisis, the legislation potentially shifts a pre-
reform problem: the potential for derivative clearing organizations in the 
newly structured swap markets to reach a systemically significant size. 
During the development of the financial crisis, it became clear that some 
financial firms were of such large influence that their collapse would 
have had a significant impact on the U.S. financial system.201 In part, 
this situation arose because of the highly regulated nature of the finance 
industry. The myriad of regulations imposed on, and support received 
by, financial institutions, especially state insurance schemes like the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, reduced the incentive of 
creditors to scrutinize creditworthiness adequately.202 The unique role 
and character of the financial industry means that the collapse of several 
systemically important—otherwise known as “too big to fail”—
institutions can freeze credit in the system, which strongly impacts all 
other sectors of the economy.203 
The shock associated with the insolvency of a systemically 
important institution is well illustrated by the experience of AIG. AIG 
was a large counterparty in credit default swaps with systemically 
important financial institutions.204 The lack of capital behind AIG’s 
positions ultimately required government intervention to prevent 
“massive losses” by AIG’s financial institution counterparties.205 
Initially, the government bailout of AIG cost $85 billion, but later was 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See Alan W. Avery et al., Dodd-Frank Attempts to Curtail Systemic Risk, 127 
BANKING L.J. 766 (2010).  
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estimated to have cost as much as $150 billion.206 These highly 
leveraged positions are common in derivatives transactions.207 The 
outcome of the AIG fiasco is a good illustration of the ability of 
systemically significant institutions to externalize the risks of their 
activities through imposing costs on society at large, while still 
internalizing profits.208 
The Reform Act provides two solutions to the problem of 
systemically important firms: (1) more stringent regulations for 
institutions determined to be systemically important; and (2) a new 
winding-up, or liquidation, process for insolvent systemically important 
firms.209 The Reform Act assigns the new Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (“FSOC”) the responsibility of determining which “nonbank 
financial companies” are systemically significant, and thus subject to a 
higher regulatory burden.210 However, the definition of a nonbank 
financial company specifically excludes derivative clearing 
organizations and swap execution facilities.211 
The winding-up process for systemically important firms may only 
be applied to “financial companies.”212 Financial companies are defined 
as bank holding companies, nonbank financial companies, or firms 
engaged in activities specified in the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956.213 However, the Bank Holding Company Act does not list clearing 
as an activity which is financial in nature.214 Therefore, it appears that 
the two mechanisms in the Reform Act designed to guard against the 
                                                                                                                 
 206. See Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial 
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destructive impact of the failure of a systemically important firm, do not 
apply to clearing organizations. 
The Reform Act mandates the clearing of what should ultimately 
prove to be a substantial majority of swap transactions, and provides for 
permissive clearing of most of the rest.215 In this framework, the final 
guarantor that a swap transaction will be completed as contemplated is 
the clearing agency. The core requirements that a DCO must consider 
when formulating its internal rules include managing the risk associated 
with cleared swaps and maintaining the financial resources necessary to 
ensure the continuance of clearing operations in the event of defaults.216 
However, such considerations are no absolute guarantee of a DCO 
always being able to meet its obligations. Unlike futures exchange 
transactions, in cleared swap transactions parties do not necessarily 
operate through an intermediary “clearing member.” Only swaps that are 
intended to hedge by a non-financial entity party are exempt from 
mandatory clearing requirements.217 And even these swaps may be 
cleared at the discretion of the hedging party.218 The consequence of 
erring on the side of clearing swaps, though admirable from the 
perspective of preserving the expectations of the parties, is that DCOs 
will be forced to deal with a wide array of parties. In a futures exchange 
setting, only those FCMs that meet the requirements of the clearing 
agency are permitted to present futures transactions for clearing.219 As a 
result, there are several levels of financial responsibility for a futures 
transaction—one for each tier in the transaction.220 
In contrast, DCOs clearing swaps could potentially be the first and 
only guarantor of a cleared swap, if the defaulting party acts on its own 
without an intermediate representative. Rather than just dealing with and 
scrutinizing its own clearing members, a DCO must ensure that all the 
swaps cleared are concluded between eligible swap participants and that 
those parties have appropriate credit and resources to warrant the 
acceptance of the swap for clearing. Further, depending on the risk 
associated with clearing a particular swap, the DCO must set 
responsively sized margin requirements for the parties to that swap. The 
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market’s increased access to information, as provided for by the Reform 
Act, however, should make it easier for DCOs to meet these 
obligations.221 
A DCO could reach a systemically important size by clearing 
swaps in such an amount that, should they fail to be cleared, it would 
jeopardize the soundness of the entire financial system.222 There are no 
specific statutory limits on the size of a DCO. The antitrust clause in 
Section 725 of the Reform Act provides that DCOs shall not take any 
action resulting in an unreasonable restraint of trade or resulting in a 
material anticompetitive burden, unless necessary or appropriate to 
comply with the Reform Act.223 A DCO, however, need not restrain 
trade in order to obtain a systematically significant place. 
Vast sums are involved in swap markets alone. The Bank for 
International Settlements estimated swap value at around $400 trillion 
notional value in 2010.224 Even aggregating only the market values of 
swap transactions yields $20 trillion in value.225 AIG’s unfunded 
obligations ultimately needed $150 billion from the government.226 Of 
the $470 trillion notional value and $13 trillion market value of swaps in 
June 2008,227 this AIG bailout figure represents only .032% or 1.1% of 
total value, respectively. Extrapolating from these numbers, a DCO 
clearing a relatively small portion of the total market could have the 
potential to destabilize the entire U.S. financial system. This logic is 
supported by the Reform Act’s provisions dealing with bank holding 
companies. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve may set a 
minimum aggregate asset standard higher than $50 billion for FSOC to 
use in determining which bank holding companies are systemically 
significant.228 
With such preliminary and general information, it would be 
inappropriate to speculate on the odds that a DCO will be unable to 
successfully clear swaps for which it is responsible. But the number and 
complexity of obligations associated with examining a swap’s parties 
and structuring its clearing affect the possibility that sufficient defaults 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See supra notes 159-167 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Dodd-Frank Act § 725. 
 224. See Bank of Int’l Settlements, supra note 12. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 227. See Bank of Int’l Settlements, supra note 12. 
 228. See Dodd-Frank Act § 115. 
2012] CLEARING SWAPS UNDER DODD-FRANK 225 
 
will render a DCO unable to meet its clearing obligations. The 
provisions in the Reform Act designed to reduce the future impact of the 
failure of systemically important firms do not apply to DCOs. As a 
result, there is a risk that a DCO will become systemically important, 
but will not be subject to the expectation by the marketplace that the 
government will decline to support their obligations in order to prevent 
systemic failure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Before the Reform Act, derivative markets were decisively 
separated into largely unregulated OTC markets and regulated futures 
markets. Then the 2008 financial crisis shook finance and exposed 
serious, potentially system-shattering problems with the derivative 
markets. Extremely leveraged transactions, extremely high transaction 
values unlimited by any physical market, serious informational 
deficiencies, and other features of derivatives all contributed to the 
problems in 2008. Swap markets, in particular, were and remain the 
single largest type of OTC derivative. 
In response, the Reform Act molds regulatory features predating 
the Act to the unique circumstances presented by swap markets. In 
doing so, the Reform Act addresses informational and credit issues 
present in swap markets, but substantially preserves the advantages of 
individualized contracting present in OTC markets. Substantial and 
thorough reporting requirements react to informational deficiencies by 
introducing large amounts of new information about trades being 
concluded into swap markets. The result is that potential parties to 
swaps can obtain a better idea of the risks they are taking on. Mandatory 
clearing of all speculative swaps, and requiring the clearing of all other 
swaps at a party’s discretion, interpose a third-party guarantee into swap 
transactions. DCOs, which undertake these clearing functions, are 
responsible for completing a troubled cleared swap transaction from the 
perspective of the non-defaulting party. Clearing, particularly when 
paired with margin requirements, reduces the counterparty risk 
associated with uncleared swap transactions. 
Although features of swap markets contributing to the 2008 
financial crisis have been addressed in the Reform Act, the new 
regulations may create a new problem. With the large value of swaps 
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that are now required to be cleared, in the many trillions of dollars, 
DCOs may be transacting with and responsible for substantial amounts 
of money. DCOs must operate in such a way as to reduce the risk of 
their inability to meet their clearing obligations, but that is no guarantee 
that all DCOs will avoid such a circumstance. One aspect of the Reform 
Act provides new rules for systemically significant institutions and new 
ways to liquidate them when insolvent. However, these rules do not 
extend to DCOs. Therefore, should a situation arise where a DCO 
clearing a systemically relevant portion of the total swap market is 
unable to meet its obligations, the government may be forced to 
intercede, much as it did with AIG and other large institutions, in order 
to preserve the existence of the financial system. 
 
